Cezary Salad

One of my readers - Morgan Oliviero from New Brunswick, Canada - recently commented on my three-part series on oil prices:

To the extent that energy is considered in many countries to be a national security interest, and thus to be heavily regulated, how does governmental interference affect the way that oil prices have been climbing?

Good question, and something well-worth considering given the current clamor from Democrats, including Sen. Obama, for an “excessive profits tax” to be levied on American oil companies.

Government interference in markets comes in two basic flavors: subsidies and taxes (spicy or mild, respectively). Both can have a significant impact on a market, though in opposite directions. Subsidies, by virtue of lowering prices, will have an upward impact on demand and incentivize suppliers to produce more to meet that demand. Taxes, by virtue of raising prices, will have a downward impact on demand and incentivize suppliers to produce less to match that decrease in demand.

How has this played out in the oil markets? Oil is traded on a global market, so energy policies in large world economies can have a marked impact on the price we pay for it in the U.S. And unfortunately, developing countries - particularly Mexico, Malaysia, India and China - heavily subsidize energy prices in an effort to keep inflation low and spur growth. Naturally, this drives demand up and decreases the incentive for oil consumers in those countries to conserve or replace their fuel consumption with greener alternatives. And that, in turn, offsets the demand destruction that we’ve been witnessing in the U.S. over the last year, making oil prices “sticky” on the way down. As Keith Bradsher of the New York Times pointed out in this well-written piece on the subject:

The oil company BP, known for thorough statistical analysis of energy markets, estimates that countries with subsidies accounted for 96 percent of the world’s increase in oil use last year — growth that has helped drive prices to record levels.

Other numbers in Bradsher’s piece are equally frightening: China devoted $40 billion to oil subsidies this year alone, Indonesia followed with $20 billion, and Malaysia - before it raised gasoline prices by 40% earlier this summer - was spending 7.5% of its GDP on oil subsidies.

How big are these numbers relative to global spend on oil? Doing some back-of-the-envelope calculations, the U.S. consumes about 20.7 million barrels of oil per day (2007 figure), which at oil’s current $114/barrel price tag comes to about $2.4 billion/day, or about a quarter of the world’s total daily spend (all these figures, and many more, are available on the EIA’s petroleum statistics page). So hundreds of billions of oil subsidies a year from developing countries are not just a drop in the bucket: a significant amount of the world’s daily spending on petroleum is subsidized, and hence insulated to some extent from the rising oil prices.

The U.S., of course, is not so insulated and hence we’ve been paying the price for rising demand in developing countries that subsidize gas prices. This is not to say that the U.S. doesn’t give out its own subsidies to the oil industry in the form of tax breaks, but that is far different from wholesale price controls on gas prices.

But despite Washington D.C.’s increasing pressure on developing countries to lower or discontinue their massive subsidies for oil prices, doing so is not so simple. Consumers who have grown accustomed to paying low prices won’t give up that right without protests or anger at the politicians who dare take it away. As Bradsher points out, the Malaysian government faced public anger and outcry when it raised the price of gasoline by 40%. So don’t expect these subsidies to go away anytime soon.

What can the U.S. do? Again, the only long-term solution to this problem is for the U.S. to decrease its reliance on petroleum and switch to home-grown alternative energy sources: all the more reason why the Pickens Plan stands out as a painful thorn in the side of Republican cries of “drill, drill, drill.”

Moving to the tax side of the equation, taxes on oil consumption have had the opposite impact and, as expected, the bigger the tax, the bigger the drop in demand for oil. But here it is important to consider at what level the taxes are being levied: the producers or the consumers. Taxes aimed at producers tend to decrease their incentive to produce more since they get less of a reward for their investment; taxes aimed at producers will tend to decrease demand when prices rise. One decreases supply, the other demand. Either way, consumption falls.

But it is important to consider these effects in concert with other market conditions. If oil prices are skyrocketing to record highs and demand abroad - thanks in part to the subsidies discussed earlier - shows no sign of abating, then oil producers have little incentive to cut back on their production just because they may be forced to pay a higher marginal tax rate on their output. In other words, the incentive to produce less as a result of higher taxes is outweighed by the incentive to produce more as a result of soaring prices and growing demand.

A perfect example of this is the situation with Canada’s Tar Sands - a lucrative source of petroleum in Canada’s Alberta province that ranks among the biggest oil reserves in the world. As Morgan points out:

Oil producers in Canada’s Tar sands have been preparing themselves for a potentially punitive redistributive carbon tax that the Liberal Party has vowed to implement should it take power . . . Aside from forcing the producing corporations to prepare for significantly increased overhead, fund managers on Bay Street have been understandably concerned that this new tax could significantly damage profits, and therefore share prices.

However, for the time being, those worries seem to be outweighed by the huge potential for greater profits from increasing oil exports in the current environment of sky-high prices and increasing demand abroad. As the AP reported last month, Canada’s TransCanada Corp. and Texas’s ConocoPhillips announced that they will spend $7 billion to nearly double the amount of oil flowing from Canada’s Tar Sands to the U.S. Gulf Coast. So rest assured, Morgan - Canada will remain the U.S. top oil exporter to the U.S. in the near future.

This implies, though, that now would be a great time to raise taxes for oil companies since their business is so profitable that they’d probably be willing to cough it up. After all, as Sen. Obama is fond of saying on the stump, ExxonMobil took home nearly $12 billion in profit last quarter. Hence the argument for a “windfall profits tax” or “excessive profits tax” that would clip the wings of their soaring profits and hand some of this money - which didn’t result from any technological innovations or greater efficiencies on the part of oil companies - back into the hands of ordinary Americans who made it possible.

But this ignores one obvious fact about the global oil industry: it is dominated by global, multi-national firms that don’t have an allegiance to any one tax code. They can just fold up their headquarters and move their tax burden elsewhere, in which case the U.S. would be worse off than it was before. More to the point, though, the flimsy concept of “windfall” or “excessive” profits is so subjective that it is likely to leave many in the business community wondering what defines “excessive” profits and whether they’re next in line for getting a haircut on their earnings from Uncle Sam. In other words, there has to be a better way.

Again, though, the better way involves hard choices and sacrifices that America as yet doesn’t seem prepared to accept. Investment in green technologies like wind and solar energy, electric and hybrid cars and just plain old conservation are not yet considered mainstream ideas on Main Street or in Congress.

Luckily, though on Wall Street - with many investment banks and private equity firms devoting talent and resources to capturing profits in green energy - the idea is catching on. And so if it is distortion of the markets from public funds that is making the oil crisis worse, it may well be private pockets that, in the end, help make it better.

I originally wrote this as one post reflecting on the trends and catalysts behind the rapid increase in oil prices. But after receiving feedback from readers, I decided to split it up into three shorter posts that examine each of the long-term trends more in-depth. The following post examines the first trend: dollar depreciation.

As oil prices continued their drop today, falling more than $18 since last Friday, analysts and commentators began to question whether oil is finally in retreat thanks to any one of a variety of pet causes and issues blamed for its dramatic rise.

But much to the chagrin of scapegoaters everywhere, unlike in years past - such as in 1973, when the OPEC oil embargo caused prices to spike - there really isn’t any one central factor that we can squarely pin the blame on for rising oil prices. Instead, three long-term trends that have been converging since the early 2000s - dollar depreciation, tightening global oil supply combined with rising demand, and increasing commodity price speculation - provided the powder keg, while the fallout from the credit crunch lit the fuse that caused oil prices to explode so fast and furiously.

Over the next three posts, I will examine each of these trends in turn - beginning with Congress’s current favorite: the depreciating dollar.

Mind the gap

As fears over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac recently brought the dollar within a penny of its record low against the Euro, members of Congress have increasingly focused on the depreciating dollar as the source of and solution to all our woes. Witness Congressman Ron Paul (R-TX) informing us at Tuesday’s biannual Humphrey-Hawkins hearing that we don’t need “a world-class regulator that is going to solve all our problems” but rather “a world class dollar - a dollar that is sound, not a dollar that continues to depreciate.”

To be sure, as Chairman Bernanke acknowledged in his testimony, the falling dollar has definitely played a role in oil’s spectacular rise over the last year. To see why, just look at the gap that’s been slowly emerging between the price of oil in dollars vs. gold:

While the price of oil in dollars has nearly doubled, the price of oil in gold has risen by 50% over the same period. This discrepancy becomes an even more jarring 3-to-1 if we turn the clock back to late 2001, when the dollar began its tumble. Small wonder that in January of this year the Financial Times crowned gold as “the new global currency.”

This has led some economists - notably Stephen P.A. Brown at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas - to estimate that the depreciation of the dollar is responsible for a large percentage of the rise in oil prices over the last seven years. “If the U.S. currency had held its 2001 value against the Euro, oil would have traded at about $80 a barrel in early 2008, about $21 below its actual price,” Brown wrote in May. And as if that weren’t high enough, in early July - sourcing Brown - New York Times business columnist David Leonhardt cited this gap as $31.

Symptoms of addiction

The dollar depreciation trend only became exacerbated by the onset of the credit crunch, which forced the Fed to slash interest rates at a time when federal banks around the world were hiking interest rates to stem inflation pressures. Consequently, the already-weakened dollar plunged even more and the changes in dollar-denominated oil became even more pronounced.

To see why, think back to America’s “addiction” to foreign oil. The United States currently imports over 70% of its oil as a way to meet its energy needs. During times of elevated oil prices, this dependency leads to large capital outflows from the U.S. to the rest of the world (what Texas oil tycoon-turned-environmentalist T. Boone Pickens called “the largest shift of money in the history of mankind” in a recent interview with the Chicago Tribune editorial board). And just as strong capital inflows tend to strengthen the dollar - as they did throughout the 1990s and early 2000s when central banks around the world were selling their gold reserves and buying up dollars - strong capital outflows tend to weaken it. The result: a vicius cycle in which oil becomes more expensive but the U.S. continues to buy it at a higher price, adding more downward pressure on the dollar, upward pressure on oil, and so on and so on.

Possible cure

Naturally, one way to break that cycle is for the U.S. to import less oil. But as global oil demand from places like India and China surges, decreased domestic demand is unlikely to make a big dent in the price of oil. Oil demand is, after all, highly correlated to income and, as Brown of the Dallas FRB points out, China’s GDP per capita rose from $1,103 in 1990 to $4,088 in 2005 while India’s went from $1,202 to $2,222 over the same period (adjusted for inflation and purchasing power parity). Couple this with the sober fact that non-OPEC supplies of oil have consistently been lower than what the industry has expected and what results is the second long-term trend that’s been driving oil prices higher: tight global supply and demand conditions.

More on this in my next post in this series.